

(167)

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY DUBAI  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 158

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
15 SEPTEMBER 1969.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 9  
16 SEP 1969

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM DUBAI.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 158 OF 15 SEPTEMBER RFI TO BAHRAIN  
RESIDENCY TEHRAN AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY JEDDA WASHINGTON  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

*North*

YOUR TELNO 551 OF 12 SEPTEMBER TO TEHRAN: TUMBS AND ABU  
MUSA.

(163)

I SPOKE TO THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH TODAY ON THE LINES OF  
YOUR PARA 5. HE SAID THAT HE KNEW QATAR AND DUBAI WERE NEGOTIATING  
ABOUT THEIR MEDIAN LINE AND HE WANTED TO SEE WHAT THE OUTCOME  
WAS BEFORE MAKING ANY MOVE HIMSELF. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS  
A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR POSITION AND HIS IN THAT HE WAS  
FACED WITH A PROBLEM OVER THE ISLANDS. WE THOUGHT IT WOULD  
BE VALUABLE FOR HIM TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE OVER THE MEDIAN LINE  
BEFORE HE WAS FACED WITH FRESH DEMANDS OVER THE ISLANDS.

I REMINDED HIM ABOUT HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE POLITICAL AGENT  
ON THIS SUBJECT (BULLARD'S TELNO 146 OF 26 JUNE).

(147)

2. SAQR ASKED FOR ADVICE ON THE METHOD OF GETTING NEGOTIATIONS  
GOING. I REMINDED HIM THAT EARLIER THIS SUMMER HE HAD TALKED  
ABOUT VISITING ENGLAND AND RETURNING VIA TEHRAN. HE AGREED  
HE HAD SAID THIS BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOW NOT VERY  
ENTHUSIASTIC. I THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WRITE A  
LETTER TO THE IRANIANS PROPOSING TALKS ON THE MEDIAN LINE.  
HE ASKED FOR MY FRANK ADVICE ON WHETHER THIS WOULD PREJUDICE

/HIS POSITION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

HIS POSITION OVER THE ISLANDS. I SAID I DID NOT SEE WHY IT SHOULD AND INDEED HIS INITIAL LETTER NEED NOT MENTION THE ISLANDS THOUGH WE OF COURSE HOPED THAT TALKS ABOUT THE MEDIAN LINE COULD LEAD TO USEFUL DISCUSSION OVER THE PROBLEM OF THE TUNBS, A POINT WHICH HE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE IRANIANS. HE CONSULTED HIS SON WHO WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT AND THEY SEEMED AGREED THAT THE LETTER WAS A GOOD IDEA. I ASKED IF I MIGHT INFORM YOU THAT HE INTENDED TO ACT IN THIS WAY AND HE SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS. HE SAID AT ONE POINT THAT HE WOULD SEND BOTH A LETTER AND QUOTE A PERSON UNQUOTE TO IRAN.

3. AS REGARDS THE RULER OF SHARJAH, I CALLED ON HIM ON 19 SEPTEMBER ON HIS RETURN FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. HE SAID HE HAD HAD USEFUL DISCUSSIONS AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND IN HIS USUAL WAY BEGAN TO TELL ME IN DETAIL WHAT HE HAD SAID. HE REPEATED VERY FIRMLY AND IN DETAIL HIS POSITION ABOUT ABU NUSA AFTER WHICH I INTERVENED TO REMIND HIM THAT HE HAD AGREED TO WRITE TO THE SHAH ABOUT THE MEDIAN LINE. HE REITERATED THAT HE WANTED TO CONSULT ABU DHABI FIRST AND THAT HE ALSO THOUGHT THE TRUCIAL STATES SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE SINGLY AND SEPARATELY ABOUT THE MEDIAN LINE. HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE IS CLEARLY STILL FRESH IN HIS MIND AND I DO NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN MY GOING BACK TO HIM SO SOON ON THIS SUBJECT. I SUGGEST THAT THE POLITICAL AGENT TAKES THIS UP AT A CONVENIENT MOMENT AFTER HIS RETURN NEXT WEEK AND I WILL DO NOTHING MORE UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY. KHALID'S VIEW THAT THE TRUCIAL STATES SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY COULD OF COURSE LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES.

RESIDENCY PASS AGENCY SAVING. FCO PASS PRIORITY TEHRAN AND SAVING JEDDA WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

M/COLES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

ARABIAN D.	DEF. POL. D.
N.E.D.	U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.	OIL D.

CONFIDENTIAL