

Reference: *FCO 8/960/1*

67896

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SECRET AND GUARD

Registry No. DEPARTMENT

E NBL/1 Arabian

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret & Guard Confidential Restricted Unclassified	Flash Immediate Priority Routine

(Date) *24/10*

Despatched *2250*

CYPRUS

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair
Code
Cypher

[Security classification -if any]

SECRET

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 5 28 OCT 1968

[Privacy marking -if any]

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to *Bahrain*

telegram No. *1102* (date) *24 October*

And to *Tehran*

repeated for information to *Dubai*

Saving to *Bahrain Agency, Jeddah, Kuwait and Washington*

Dubai telegram saving 63 [22 October] to Bahrain, Tehran telegram 1629 [23 October] to me and Wiggin's letter of 17 October from Tehran. The Tunbs.

As we see it, we need at the present juncture to make sure that the dialogue between the Iranians and the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah keeps going (and there seems a danger of its running into the sand), while avoiding ^{our own own} involvement in the exchanges. There is a serious risk that if Sakr replies in writing to the Iranian draft he will make the Iranians more intransigent; but there is also a corresponding risk that if he ignores it completely the dialogue will peter out. At the same time, as seen from here, there must be some danger that the Iranians will consider that we inspired any hardening, as it may appear to them, in Saqr's attitude since his return

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Draft Telegram to: *Bahrain (RES)*
No. *1102*
(Date) *24/10*

And to: *Tehran (P)*

Repeat to: *Dubai (P)*

~~Saving to: Bahrain Agency, Jeddah, Kuwait, Washington~~

[Handwritten signature]

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Drafted by Mr. Egan, amended by Mr. Lick, and approved by Heads of Eastern & Arabian Divs.

1715Z 24/10/68

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/to

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to the Trucial States. We must assume that the bias in any second-hand reports they may receive from the Trucial States will give colour to this interpretation.

2. Accordingly, unless H.M. Political Resident sees objection, I should be grateful if H.M. Political Agent Dubai would as he suggests discourage Saqr from making a written reply. At the same time he should encourage Saqr to continue the dialogue, possibly making orally (e.g. through his son when Khalid visits Iran shortly) the point that he cannot so readily concede sovereignty over the islands, but not treating the Iranian draft as the last word on the subject. P.A. Dubai should please report by telegram when he has done so and repeat to Tehran.

3. We agree also that H.M. Ambassador Tehran should tell the Iranians as he proposes, that we much hope that Iran could reach an agreement with Saqr over the Tunbs without trying to pin him down in writing on the sovereignty issue. He should at the same time tell the Iranians that after hearing that Saqr had had to regard their document as unacceptable we are advising him not to take any step which might make the continuation of his dialogue with them more difficult. We should, however, prefer that H.M. Ambassador Tehran should make no specific reference to the establishment of an Iranian base. If the Iranians (or Saqr) allowed it to become known that we had used such language the results could be damaging. Could this be got over by the following formula? "It should not be beyond the wit of man to arrange an exchange of letters whereby agreement could

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be reached on arrangements for the administration and use of the islands without either side having to abandon its own position as regards sovereignty over the islands."

JL
24/11

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