

S E C R E T - G U A R D

(29)

CYBER/CAT A
 PRIORITY JEDDA TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 648 3 NOVEMBER 1968
 SECRET

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 648 OF 3 NOV RE: TO BAHRAIN
 RES. TEHRAN AND SAVING TO KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN AGENCY
 WASHINGTON DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI AND UEMIS NEW YORK.
 GUARD

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K LEVEL Div ARCHIVES No. 2 - 4 NOV 1968
<i>NB 44</i>

(19)

YOUR TELNO 913 OF 30 OCT. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE
 PERSIAN GULF.

I THINK THE BEST WAY OF PUTTING THE THOUGHT IN YOUR PARAS
 4 AND 5 TO THE SAUDIS WOULD BE FOR ME TO FOLLOW UP
 A LETTER IN WHICH I HAVE GIVEN DR. PHAROON SOME FACTUAL
 INFORMATION ABOUT THE ISLANDS WITH ANOTHER. THIS
 WOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN DRAWING ATTENTION TO SUGGEST-
 IONS IN THE PIECE OF PAPER WHICH CRAIG GAVE TO SAQQAF LAST
 JUNE, BUT IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY I WOULD WISH TO
 TEXT WHICH IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. I THINK A PURELY ORAL APPROACH WOULD
 RISK BEING LOST IN THE CACOPHONY OF ADVICE AND INFORMAT-
 ION COMING FROM VARIOUS SIDES. WE MIGHT HAVE OPPORTUNITY
 TO SPEAK AND PASS COPY TO KAMAL ADHAM HERE ALSO.

FCO PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN AGENCY
 WASHINGTON DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI UEMIS NEW YORK.

MR. MORRIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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- 4 NOV 1968
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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY JEDDA TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 650 3 NOVEMBER 1968.

SECRET AND GUARD.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 650 OF 3 NOVEMBER R F I TO BAHRAIN
RESIDENCY TEHRAN SAVING TO KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN AGENCY WASHINGTON
DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI AND UKHIS NEW YORK.

BY TELEGRAM 648 (23) SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

PERSONAL. IN OUR CONVERSATION ON 24 OCTOBER, YOU ENQUIRED
WHETHER I THOUGHT THE IDEAS WHICH YOU HAD DISCUSSED WITH MR.
CRAIG LAST JUNE MIGHT STILL OFFER A POSSIBLE WAY TO A SOLUTION
OF PROBLEMS IN THE GULF.

2. I HAVE LOOKED BACK AT MR. CRAIG'S SUGGESTIONS TO SEE IF THERE
IS SOMETHING IN THEM WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN THE DISCUSSIONS
DURING THE SHAH'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. OF COURSE, AS YOU TOLD ME,
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IS THAT OF BAHRAIN AND THE U.A.E. APART FROM
THAT, HOWEVER, THE SUGGESTION THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE MOST TO PROGRESS
TOWARDS A SOLUTION SEEMS TO BE THAT CONCERNING THE MEDIAN LINE.

3. NOW THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A SAUDI/IRANIAN MEDIAN
LINE, MR. CRAIG'S SUGGESTION OF AN OVERALL PACKAGE, INCLUDING THIS,
IS NO LONGER RELEVANT BUT IT WOULD STILL BE A POSSIBLE WAY OUT
OF SOME(GP UNDEC) DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE GULF ISLANDS IF AGREEMENT
COULD BE REACHED BETWEEN IRAN AND THE GULF STATES ON DRAWING A
MEDIAN LINE BETWEEN THEM WHICH TOOK THE MAINLAND COASTLINE AS ITS
BASE AND WAS THEN USED AS A GUIDE IN DECIDING WHERE THE ISLANDS
WOULD GO. THE EFFECT OF THIS WOULD BE TO LEAVE SIRRI AND THE TUNB
ISLANDS ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, ABU MUSA (AND OF COURSE BAHRAIN)
ON THE ARAB SIDE.

F C O PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN AGENCY WASHINGTON
DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI AND UKHIS NEW YORK
MR MORRIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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cc: FCO 8/960/1

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CONFIDENTIAL

IER/CAT A
ROUTINE JEDDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 662

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
9 NOVEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 662
OF 9 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN BAHRAIN RESIDENCY,
AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON KUWAIT DOHA BAHRAIN AGENCY DUBAI AND
DHABI.

(29)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 918 : SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF.

LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO DR. PHARAON ON 6 NOVEMBER BY ARMITAGE,
WHO EXPLAINED ORALLY THE IMPLICATIONS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD
TO HAVE THIS OPINION WHICH WAS IN LINE WITH THEIR OWN THOUGHTS.
WE KNOW THE LETTER HAS GONE TO KING FEISAL, AND A COPY WAS ALSO
LEFT WITH ADHAM. U.S. AMBASSADOR TELLS ME THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED
SUBJECT WITH DR. PHARAON SINCE I SAW LATTER ON 24 OCTOBER, AND
FOUND THAT THE SAUDI HOPE WAS THAT THE SAHAB WOULD BE PERSUADED
TO AGREE TO A MEDIAN LINE WHICH WOULD LEAVE TURBS AND SIRRI WITH
IRAN, ABU NUSA WITH THE ARABS.

F.C.O. PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON KUWAIT DOHA BAHRAIN AGENCY DUBAI
AND ABU DHABI.

DR. MORRIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

12/18/

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CYPHER/CAT.A. AND BY BAG
 PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
 TELL AM NO. 918

TO JEDDA
 4 NOVEMBER 1968
 (NB ARABIAN)

SECRET AND GUARD

ADDRESSED TO JEDDA TELEGRAM NO. 918 OF 4 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR
 INFORMATION TO RESIDENCY BAHRAIN, TEHRAN AND SAVING TO KUWAIT,
 AGENCY BAHRAIN; W'TON, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, UKMIS NEW YORK,
 BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELS. NOS. 648 AND 650:

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

WE ARE CONTENT THAT YOU SHOULD RECORD OUR POSITION IN WRITING,
 BUT THINK THAT WE SHOULD BE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE WORDING
 OF A WRITTEN STATEMENT THAN OVER WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ORALLY. WE
 AGREE THAT ANYTHING WRITTEN MIGHT BE GIVEN TO KAMAL ADHAM AS WELL
 AS TO PHARAON BUT, GIVEN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS, WE SHOULD
 AGAIN BE CAREFUL OF ANYTHING IN WRITING WHICH MIGHT LATER BE
 DISCLOSED BY THE IRANIANS EITHER PUBLICLY OR IN DEALING WITH PAR-
 TICULAR RULERS (SEE FOR EXAMPLE THE STATEMENTS TO THE SON OF THE
 RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH IN DUBAI TEL. NO. 499 TO BAHRAIN).
 WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE SAUDI CONCESSIONS TO THE IRANIANS
 OVER THEIR MEDIAN LINE MAY HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT ADEQUATE QUID
 PRO QUO. BUT IF THE SAUDIS HAVE, AS THE RULER'S SON QUOTES THE
 IRANIANS AS CLAIMING, REACHED SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH THE IRANIANS
 WHICH MIGHT DISPOSE OF THE TUNBS IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER THAT THE
 ONUS SHOULD REMAIN ON SAUDI ARABIA RATHER THAN ON HMG.

2. WE SHOULD THEREFORE PREFER PARA. 3 OF YOUR DRAFT LETTER TO READ:
 "NOW THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A SAUDI/IRANIAN MEDIAN
 LINE THE EARLIER SUGGESTION OF AN OVERALL PACKAGE, INCLUDING THAT
 SECTOR OF THE MEDIAN LINE, MAY NO LONGER BE RELEVANT. IT WOULD
 CERTAINLY HOWEVER EASE MATTERS IN SETTLING THE PROBLEMS OF THE

/EASTERN GULF

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11/11

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-2-

EASTERN GULF IF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD AGREE THAT THE WAY TO CONSTRUCT A MEDIAN LINE THROUGH THE GULF WHERE ONE HAS NOT YET BEEN AGREED WOULD BE TO TAKE THE MAINLAND COASTLINE AS ITS BASE. AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE SEA BED ON THIS BASIS WOULD CREATE CONFIDENCE AND A SENSE OF AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL INTERESTS, AND WOULD FACILITATE THE SOLUTION OF REMAINING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THAT OF BAHRAIN."

(RESIDENCY BAHRAIN PASS SAVING TO AGENCY BAHRAIN, DOHA, DUBAI AND ABU DHABI)

STEWART

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO JEDDA

TE GRAM NUMBER 913

30 OCTOBER 1968 (NB)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO JEDDA TELEGRAM NUMBER 913 OF 30 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, TEHRAN, KUWAIT AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, UKMIS NEW YORK. B3/371/1 (2)

GUARD
YOUR LETTER 2/31 TO HEAD OF ARABIAN DEPARTMENT OF 24 OCTOBER ; SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

YOU SPOKE WELL.

2. IN PARAGRAPH 8 YOU ASKED WHETHER YOU SHOULD PUT ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PACKAGE DEALS TO PHARAON BEFORE THE SHAH'S VISIT. YOU WILL SINCE HAVE SEEN MY TELEGRAM NO. 2015 TO TEHRAN OF ~~25~~ ^{NBS/3246} OCTOBER WHICH SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR US NOT TO RE-OPEN PACKAGES WITH THE SHAH AT THIS STAGE.

3. THE SAUDIS SEEM TO HAVE CLINCHED A MEDIAN LINE AGREEMENT WITH THE IRANIANS AS A SELF-CONTAINED EXERCISE. THIS MAY THUS HAVE ELIMINATED ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN A PACKAGE DEAL AS WE CONCEIVED IT IN THE EARLY SUMMER, ESPECIALLY AS IT INVOLVES CONCESSIONS TO THE IRANIANS WITHOUT KNOWN QUID PRO QUO. GIVEN ALSO THE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS IN PROCESS ON THE TUNBS BETWEEN THE IRANIANS AND THE RULER OF RAS AL KHAIMAH, AND THE DIRECT IRANO/BAHRAINI CONSULTATION, TO BOTH OF WHICH WE REFERRED IN OUR TELEGRAM, IT SEEMED TACTICALLY BETTER NOT TO TALK AGAIN OURSELVES IN TERMS OF PACKAGES TO THE IRANIANS JUST AT THIS MOMENT. SIR D. WRIGHT'S CONVERSATION WITH THE ACTING IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 17 OCTOBER (RECORD WITH WESTON'S LETTER OF 24 OCTOBER) HAS CONFIRMED THIS (u) IMPRESSION.

4. WE DOUBT WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEED FOR US TO REMIND THE IRANIANS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, ESPECIALLY OVER BAHRAIN. WE SUSPECT THAT IT MAY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR US TO REMIND THEM-THOUGH IF H M AMBASSADOR

SECRET - GUARD

/FINDS

B3/371/1

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2.

FINDS IN THE COURSE OF HIS NORMAL DEALINGS WITH THE IRANIANS THAT IT IS DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY HE HAS DISCRETION TO SPEAK APPROPRIATELY. AS REGARDS THE SAUDIS THERE MAY, IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH PHARAON, BE MORE OF A CASE FOR PROMPTING THEM TO GRASP THE NETTLE OF THE REAL GULF PROBLEMS WITH THE SHAH DURING HIS STATE VISIT AND TO MAKE THE MOST OUT OF THEIR CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE IN THE MEDIAN LINE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CASE MAY BE STRONGER IF YOU SEE ANY MORE DANGER SIGNS THAT THE SAUDIS WILL NOT GIVE THE OTHER GULF PROBLEMS FULL TREATMENT OR WILL WASTE TIME UNDULY ON PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE KING (E.G. THE ZIONIST-COMMUNIST WORLD CONSPIRACY) WHICH ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE GULF AND ALSO LIKELY TO LOWER THE SHAH'S VIEW OF FAISAL'S JUDGEMENT.

5. WE AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE DEPLORABLE IF THE SHAH AND KING FAISAL WERE TO LIMIT THEMSELVES TO BANALITIES. AT THE SAME TIME THEIR DIFFERING PREOCCUPATIONS OVER THE GULF PROBLEMS AT ISSUE MAY WELL PREVENT AGREEMENT ON A DEFINED PACKAGE, ESPECIALLY SO LONG AS THE SHAH IS ENCOURAGED BY SOME OF THE RULERS IN A SENSE DAMAGING TO THE UAE. IN THAT CASE WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE TWO MONARCHS WOULD AT LEAST AGREE ON COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS AS REGARDS STABILITY AND CO-OPERATION. THE MOST HELPFUL SINGLE POINT OF AGREEMENT (ASSUMING THAT THEY REMAIN DISAGREED ON THE UAE) WOULD BE THAT THE MEDIAN LINE EAST OF SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD BE DRAWN ON MAINLAND BASE LINE PRINCIPLES AND SHOULD THEREAFTER BE A GUIDE IF NOT A DETERMINANT ON OTHER PROBLEMS OFFSHORE THE MAINLAND. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE TOLD THE BAHRAINIS BEFORE THE GENEVA MEETING THAT WE SAW NO HARM IN TRYING THIS ON THE IRANIANS, THOUGH WE DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD AGREE. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THEY DID NOT RAISE IT, BUT THE SHAH MAY BE MORE DISPOSED TO CONSIDER IT IF THE KING PUTS IT FORWARD.

6. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO PUT THE THINKING IN PARAS 4 AND 5 ABOVE IN THE WAY YOU JUDGE BEST.

7. SINCE DRAFTING THIS TELEGRAM WE HAVE RECEIVED TEHRAN TELNO 1641, BUT THINK THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FOREGOING REMAINS VALID.

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