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3. I REMINDED ZELLI THAT WE HAD A DEFENCE AGREEMENT WITH THE RULERS. WHEN IT LAPSED IN 1971 THE IRANIANS COULD OF COURSE SEIZE THE ISLANDS, BUT THIS WOULD BRING DOWN ON THEM THE WRATH OF THE ARAB WORLD. IT SEEMED TO ME THEREFORE THAT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND. AS REGARDS SIRRI I HAD NO REASON WHATSOEVER TO SUPPOSE THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVE THERE HAD SPOKEN AS ALLEGED AND SUGGESTED THAT ZELLI SHOULD CHECK HIS SOURCE VERY CAREFULLY. (I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM BY PHONE THAT CLARKE LEFT DUBAI SEVERAL MONTHS AGO). IN THE MEANTIME I WOULD ALSO MAKE ENQUIRIES.

4. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ZELLI SAID HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE PIECE OF PAPER I HAD GIVEN TO MR. AFSHAR IN JULY (MY TEL NO 699). THIS SUGGESTS THAT ZELLI IS TRYING TO MUSCLE IN ON THE ACT RATHER THAN THAT HE HAS ANY REAL AUTHORITY ON THIS ISLAND ISSUE. HE IS NATIONALISTIC AND RATHER DENSE AS WELL AS BEING A ZAHEDI MAN AND WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO CIRCUMVENT HIM.

5. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE MINISTER OF COURT HAS PHONED TO ENQUIRE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OBJECTION TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL DEALING WITH THE TWO RULERS. HE SAID HE HAD ARAM IN MIND. I SAID THERE WAS NO OBJECTION.

FCO PASS PRIORITY DUBAI.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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CYPHER/CAT 'A'
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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
15 SEPTEMBER, 1969

TOP COPY

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 9
15 SEP 1969
NB 41

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 803 OF 13 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BAHRAIN AGENCY (RES'Y PASS) AND DUBAI.

BY TEL NO 738 (NOT TO DUBAI), PARA 6; AND YOUR TEL NO 561.

THE TURKS AND ABU MUSA.

ZELLI, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING. HE REFERRED TO OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION
ABOUT THE DISPUTED ISLANDS AND SAID HE MUST REMIND ME THAT IRAN
COULD NOT COMPROMISE OVER THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. HE QUIZZED
ME AGAIN ABOUT THE TWO RULERS' REACTIONS TO WHAT H.M. POLITICAL AGENT
HAD SAID TO THEM ABOUT REACHING AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. HE ALSO SAID
HE HAD RECEIVED A DISTURBING REPORT THAT MR. CLARKE IN DUBAI HAD
TOLD THE RULER THERE THAT HE SHOULD SAY OR DO NOTHING THAT
RECOGNISED IRANIAN POSSESSION OF SIRRI. FINALLY HE ASKED THAT OUR
REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD AGAIN URGE THE TWO RULERS TO SETTLE MATTERS
WITH IRAN.

2. I TOLD ZELLI THAT IN OUR VIEW IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT
IMPOSSIBLE POLITICALLY FOR THE TWO RULERS EXPLICITLY TO RECOGNISE
IRANIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS; WE HOPED HOWEVER A
FORMULA COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH FLUFFED THIS ISSUE YET PROVIDED
THE IRANIANS WITH SUCH FACILITIES AS THEY MIGHT WANT ON THE
ISLANDS. I REMINDED HIM THAT SUCH A FORMULA HAD NEARLY BEEN AGREED
LAST YEAR WITH RAS AL KHAIWAN. THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING MORE FOR US
TO SAY TO THE RULERS, THOUGH OF COURSE IF THEY ASKED FOR ADVICE WE
WOULD CONTINUE TO TELL THEM THAT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO REACH
AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. AS WE SAW IT THE ^{TEXT WAS UP TO IRANIANS.}
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